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A CALIFORNIA JUVENILE'S RIGHT TO TRIAL BY
JURY: AN ISSUE NOW OVERRIPE FOR
CONSIDERATION
Nearly ten years ago California's Chief Justice observed "[tihe
time is drawing inevitably closer when this court must confront, in
light of the developing changes in the function of the juvenile
court system, whether the immunity of that system from all of the
protections of the criminal courts can withstand constitutional
scrutiny."' This Comment submits that the time that was drawing
inevitably closer has now arrived. The issue of a juvenile's right to
trial by jury is not 'Just ripe for Supreme Court reconsideration,"
or timely legislative intervention, "it is overripe."2
INTRODUCTION
The California juvenile justice system has changed dramatically
since its inception in 1903. Unlike earlier juvenile justice practice,
there is no longer uniform treatment of dependent, delinquent, and
neglected children. Over the past eighty-five years there has been
movement away from the state's acting as a "benevolent father"
during juvenile delinquency proceedings, to the state's adopting more
criminal-like procedures.
During this eighty-five year period, the United States Supreme
Court and the California Supreme Court have afforded juvenile de-
linquents many of the procedural due process protections available in
adult criminal proceedings. Although California now provides many
protections, one essential due process right remains unavailable to
juveniles: the right to a jury trial. This Comment argues that the
rationale for the original denial of this right is suspect, and that con-
i. In re Mitchell P., 22 Cal. 3d 946, 962 n.14, 587 P.2d 1114, 1155, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 330, 341 (1978) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
2. In re Javier A., 159 Cal. 3d 913, 968, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 424 (1984).
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tinued denial of the right is inappropriate and patently unfair.
This Comment traces the origin and development of the juvenile
justice system. In essence, a quid pro quo system was established
where a minor's due process rights were exchanged for the protection
and rehabilitative efforts of the juvenile court. The Comment notes
the failure of juvenile courts to effect this purpose and then analyzes
United States Supreme Court case law which extends procedural
due process rights to minors. Following a critical examination of
California case law, the Comment addresses the trend toward the
"criminalization" of California juvenile delinquency proceedings.
The Comment delineates the strong public policy benefits of granting
juveniles the right to a jury trial and suggests that the continued
denial of this important right can no longer be justified. The Com-
ment concludes that timely legislative intervention is necessary to se-
cure this right.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
A separate and distinct court system arose for juveniles in the
United States in the early ninteenth century.3 Urban centers were
experiencing rapid expansion attributable to industralization and im-
migration.4 Along with the burgeoning cities came the concomitant
problems of overcrowding, poverty, and crime. Consequently, the
family unit - which had traditionally provided for home education,
discipline, and overall structure and unity - seemed threatened.5
The child welfare movement developed in response to these condi-
tions and concerns.
6
Social reformers who pioneered this movement were primarily up-
per and middle class women.7 They thought children were suscepti-
ble to the influences of immorality, and might be attracted to crime.8
The child welfare movement was based on the concept that juveniles
could be treated individually by combining early intervention with
utilization of enlightened social theories and scientific methods.Y As
3. See generally A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELIN-
QUENCY (1969); S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-1920 (1977).
4. P. PARSLOE. JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 27
(1978).
5. A. PLATT, supra note 3, at 98.
6. See generally P. HAHN, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER AND THE LAW (3d ed.
1984); L. EMPEY. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHILDHOOD DELINQUENCY AND SO-
CIAL REFORM OF THE JUVENILE SYSTEM 44-47 (1976); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An
Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); A. PLATT, supra note 3.
7. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION IN THE JUVENILE COURTS:
GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 4 (1973).
8. M. PAULSEN, THE PROBLEMS OF JUVENILE COURTS AND THE RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN 4 (1975).
9. See generally Fox, supra note 6, at 1231-39.
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the traditional role of family was diminishing, the state was seen as
having an obligation to provide for its needy youth."0 The social re-
formers advocated progressive reliance on the state, utilizing govern-
ment as the vector to rectify social problems."
The first juvenile court system was founded in Illinois in 1899,12
and other states quickly adopted various juvenile court acts.'" These
statutes were based on the doctrine of parens patriae.14 The state, in
effect, assumed the function of a surrogate parent by providing for
the supervision of minors whose parents were either unwilling or un-
able to perform their parental duties.' 5 The state, as the "ultimate
parent," exercised authority for the care, protection and guidance of
juveniles when public intervention was deemed necessary.'
6
The jurisdiction of early juvenile courts included abandoned and
neglected children as well as delinquent youth.' 7 Juvenile courts
were established in order to protect minors from the harshness of the
criminal law system. A juvenile court's focus was not on the act that
brought the minor before the court;' rather, it was concerned with
the child's underlying problems and needs.' 9 Once these were ascer-
tained, the court decided what intervention was necessary to save the
child from a "downward career."20 Thus, the juvenile court made no
10. P. PARSLOE, supra note 4, at 48.
II. See S. HAYS. THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914 (1957).
12. "This act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purposes may be
carried out, to wit: that the care, trust, custody, and discipline of a child shall approxi-
mate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents." Act of Apr. 21,
1899, 1899 Ill. Laws § 21.
13. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 7 (1960).
14. Parens patriae, literally "parent of the country," refers traditionally to the
role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability. Parens pa-
triae originates from the English common law where the king had a royal prerogative to
act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants, idiots and lunatics. In
the United States, the parens patriae function belongs with the states. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
15. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909); E. RYERSON, BE-
TWEEN JUSTICE AND COMPASSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE JUVENILE COURT 10-12
(1970).
16. Mack, supra note 15, at 109.
17. P. HAHN, supra note 4, at 5-6; GAULT: WHAT NOW FOR THE JUVENILE
COURT? 9 (V. Nordin ed. 1968) (one of the old-fashioned terms for "delinquency" is
incorrigibility; this term is still utilized in some state statutes).
18. Mack, supra note 15, at 119. See also E. ELDEFONSO, LAw ENFORCEMENT
AND THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER: DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (1983) (imma-
turity exempts juveniles from moral responsibility for their illegal behavior).
19. F. MCCARTHY & J. CARR. JUVENILE LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 53-70 (1980);
Mack, supra note 15, at 120.
20. Mack, supra note 15, at 120.
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distinction between delinquent and dependent youth. A murderer
and a loiterer were equally in need of individual rehabilitative treat-
ment to become morally upright, productive adults.21
The primary purpose of the juvenile justice system was the suc-
cessful reformation of errant youth. Therefore, the court's focus was
directed at rehabilitation rather than punishment.2 In order for
judges to function in this newly created system, it was essential that
they obtain a great deal of freedom and discretionary power.23
Judges needed the ability to assess each youth as an individual. They
then sought enough discretionary power to determine the best socio-
logical treatment, and the freedom to implement a flexible treatment
plan.24
The early California juvenile justice system was also based on the
parens patriae concept.25 In 1903, California became the seventh
state to enact a juvenile court act.26 This act provided for separate
court jurisdiction for children under the age of sixteen. In 1909, a
juvenile court law was enacted, raising the age limit to eighteen and
providing for separate juvenile courts.27
California, like other states with emerging juvenile justice systems,
fashioned informal courtroom proceedings. 28 The formal procedural
and structural trappings of the adult courtroom were to be replaced
with a cooperative atmosphere. In this nonadversarial setting, the
judge would spend time with each child, gaining the youth's confi-
dence and trust. Through the cooperative efforts of the minor and
the juvenile justice system, the youth's underlying problems could be
determined and a proper disposition made.29 Because the emphasis
21. P. HAHN, supra note 6, at 6.
22. P. PARSLOE, supra note 4, at 49.
23. [The juvenile court judge] must be a student of and deeply interested in
the problems of philanthropy and child life as well as a lover of children. He
must be able to understand the boys' point of view and ideas of justice; he must
be willing and patient enough to search out the underlying cause of the trouble
and to formulate the plan by which, through the cooperation, offtimes, of many
agencies, the cure may be effected.
Mack, supra note 15, at 119.
24. See P. PARSLOE, supra note 6, at 59.
25. See generally In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924).
26. 1903 Cal. Stat. 44.
27. 1909 Cal. Stat. 213.
28. "A characteristic of California's juvenile courts is the pronounced absence of
uniformity of court procedures." CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COMM'N ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE 29 (1960). See also M. PAULSEN, supra note 8, at 5, 12 (1975).
29. Mack, supra note 15, at 120. The following account of Judge Mack depicts
how the juvenile court was to operate:
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be made to know
that he is face to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same
time, and more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its care
and solitude. The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in such
hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the
bar, can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the
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of the juvenile court was not on punishment or sanctions, due process
safeguards were deemed unnecessary.30 Thus, the well-intentioned
flexibility and informality of California's juvenile court system ulti-
mately led to the subversion of the juvenile's procedural due process
rights.
THE SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES JUVENILE DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS
Before 1966, most states upheld constitutional challenges against
the validity of juvenile court proceedings. 31 However, it was becom-
ing evident that the juvenile justice system was not living up to the
idealistic standards that originally had been envisioned.3 2 Sixty-seven
years after the Illinois Act of 1899, the United States Supreme
Court began to determine the constitutionality of juvenile justice
proceedings.
child at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulders
and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity,
will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work.
Id.
30. P. PARSLOE, supra note 4, at 48.
31. California courts' continued denial of due process protection was based on
sentiments similar to the holding in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198
(1905), which stated:
The natural parent needs no process to temporarily deprive his child of its lib-
erty by confining it in his home, to save it and to shield it from the conse-
quences of persistence in a career of waywardness, nor is the state, when com-
pelled as parens patriae, to take the place of the father for the same purpose,
required to adopt any process as a means of placing its hands upon the child to
lead it into one of its courts . . . . [T]he court . . . determines [the child's
salvation, and not its punishment].
Id. at 53, 62 A. at 200.
32. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1971). "We must rec-
ognize . . that the fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early
reformers . . . have not been realized." Id. at 543-44; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376
(1970) (there is a lack of qualified personnel, and the juvenile court staff and facilities
tend to be inadequate).
A 1976 study, by the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, reveals that:
[L]ess than 10 percent of the 7685 juvenile court judges in the nation were
full-time juvenile court judges. In addition, half of these judges had no under-
graduate degree, one-fifth were not members of the bar, and three-fourths de-
voted less than one-fourth of their time to juvenile matters. About one-third of
all judges had no probation and social work staff, and between 80-90 percent
had no psychologists.
E. ELDEFONSO, supra note 18, at 127. A further indication of the juvenile courts' failure
is the increase in juvenile crime, violence and recidivism. The President's Commission on
Crime reports that in 1966, approximately 66% of 16 and 17-year-old juveniles before
the court, had been before the court previously. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
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The Supreme Court's first decision on this issue was in Kent v.
United States.33 The Arizona juvenile court had waived jurisdiction
over a sixteen-year-old youth charged with robbery and rape. The
waiver allowed the minor to be tried as an adult in the district
court. 34 The judge of the juvenile court stated that he made the
transfer decision only after completing a "full investigation." How-
ever, in making his determination, the judge did not consult the juve-
nile, his parents, or his counsel. 35 In fact, the judge made his deter-
mination without any hearing. The minor appealed the
constitutionality of this procedure.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, holding
that the procedural due process rights to a fair hearing and effective
assistance of counsel must be afforded to a juvenile before jurisdic-
tion is relinquished. 36 These due process rights included allowing the
defendant access to probation reports and social study reports, as
well as providing a statement of the reasons for the court's deci-
sion. 37 The Court was critical of the then-current state of the juve-
nile justice system. Although its purposes were laudable, there was a
marked disparity between the theory and the actual practice of the
juvenile court.38 The difference between the ideal and the reality of
the system resulted in the minor obtaining the "worst of both worlds:
He gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 39 Justice
Fortas, writing for the majority, remarked that the application of the
parens patriae philosophy "is not an invitation to procedural arbi-
trariness."'40 The Supreme Court went on to state that a continued
denial of due process rights could no longer be justified.41
The holding in Kent did not extend all procedural due process
rights to juveniles. Rather, the Supreme Court stated that juvenile
33. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
34. This procedure is similar to a "fitness hearing" in California juvenile courts.
Before a juvenile is transferred to adult court there must be a determination that he is
not "amenable to the care, treatment, and training program . . . of the juvenile court."
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West 1987).
35. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
36. Id. at 554.
37. Id. at 557.
38. Id. at 555 (footnote omitted). Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, noted:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts,
studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual
performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolera-
ble the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees
applicable to adults.
Id.
39. Id. at 556. For an explanation of why juveniles are not receiving the care and
treatment postulated by the original juvenile justice system, see supra note 32.
40. Kent, 383 U.S. at 555.
41. See generally id.
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proceedings must "measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment." '42 Juvenile justice systems thus received notice that
arbitrary actions would not be tolerated, and a fundamental fairness
analysis would be applied to juvenile proceedings.
The landmark decision of In re Gault4 3 followed one year later.
Fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was charged with making lewd tele-
phone calls. The hearing was held in an Arizona juvenile court, with-
out procedural formality. The court determined that Gault was a
delinquent and made him a ward of the court. 4 The dispositional
order stated that he was to be committed to an industrial school un-
til his twenty-first birthday.45
On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
requirements of due process applied in the adjudicatory phase of de-
linquency proceedings where incarceration may result. The Court's
review focused on the constitutionality of the informal nature of the
delinquency hearing. Gault had not been provided with adequate no-
tice of the charges against him. 46 The juvenile court did not advise
the minor, or his parents, of his right to counsel. In fact, no counsel
was present on behalf of the minor at any stage of the delinquency
proceeding.47 The minor was not advised that he did not have to tes-
tify, or that an incriminating statement could result in a delinquency
commitment.48 The complaining witness, who allegedly received the
obscene calls, was not present in court.49 Thus, she could not testify
or be cross-examined. In affirming the fundamental fairness analysis
of Kent, the Supreme Court held the Arizona proceeding
unconstitutional.
50
The Court in Gault stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amend-
ment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."'" The Court rejected
the argument that constitutional protections were unnecessary in a
system based on parens patriae. "[T]he constitutional and theoreti-
42. Id. at 562 (quoting Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (1959)).
43. 387 U.S. I (1967).
44. See id.
45. Id. at 31. A petition was filed stating simply that Gerald Gault was a delin-
quent minor and that a court order was necessary for his welfare.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 35. The Supreme Court rejected the Arizona court's assertion that rep-
resentation by counsel was at the discretion of the juvenile courts.
48. Id. at 44.
49. Id. at 7. The complaining witness was never present in court. The single con-
tact with the witness consisted of a telephone conversation with the probation officer.
50. Id. at 57.
51. Id. at 13.
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cal basis for this peculiar system is . . . debatable. '5 2 Therefore,
juvenile proceedings resulting in the deprivation of liberty require
due process protections. These include: the right to adequate notice
to prepare for court proceedings;5 3 the right to be represented by
counsel; 54 the privilege against self-incrimination;"5 and the rights of
confrontation and cross-examination .5  The Court noted that the ob-
servance of due process protections was not inconsistent with the re-
habilitative objectives of the juvenile court.
5 7
The constitutional protections that the Supreme Court applied in
Gault were expanded in In re Winship.58 Juvenile cases, because of
their civil nature, used the "preponderance of evidence" standard of
proof. The Court in Winship held that a New York juvenile statute
establishing this standard violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 9
The Court held that minors on trial in a juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding are entitled to be tried according to the criminal law stan-
dard of proof - beyond a reasonable doubt. 60 The majority opinion
52. Id. at 17.
53. See generally id. at 31-34. "Notice, to comply with due process requirements,
must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable
opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it 'must set forth the alleged misconduct
with particularity.'" Id. at 33.
54. See generally id. at 34-42. The Court quoted the Standards for Juvenile and
Family Courts published by the Children's Bureau of the United States Deptartment of
Health, Education and Welfare: "As a component part of a fair hearing required by due
process guaranteed under the 14th amendment, notice of the right to counsel should be
required at all hearings and counsel provided upon request when the family is financially
unable to employ counsel." Id. at 39. The Court went on to hold that the assistance of
counsel is "essential for the determination of delinquency." Id. at 36. This due process
right has become essential because of the increased formality and adversary nature of
juvenile delinquency proceedings:
The significance of this right cannot be sufficiently emphasized. Without coun-
sel, neither the juvenile nor his parents can deal with the overwhelming com-
plexities of the juvenile court. They will be unable to prepare a forceful and
cogent defense. Moreover, they may not appreciate the significance of those
rights that they may have inadvertently waived, such as the privilege against
self incrimination and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
F. BAILEY, HANDLING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES § 10.2 (1982).
55. See generally Gault, 387 U.S. at 44-56. The fifth amendment privilege refers
only to criminal cases, however, the Gault Court stated that juvenile delinquency cases
"must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination."
Id. at 49.
56. See generally id. at 56-57. "[A]bsent a valid confession, a determination of
delinquency .. . cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the
opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitutional require-
ments." Id. at 57.
57. Id. at 21. "ITihe observance of due process standards, intelligently and not
ruthlessly administered, will not compel the states to abandon or displace any of the
substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Id.
58. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
59. Id. at 369.
60. Id. at 368.
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stated that this standard was required as one of the "essentials of
due process and fair treatment.161 This due process protection was
extended over the dissent's concern that the "difference between ju-
venile courts and traditional criminal courts" would be eroded.6 2 The
majority's rationale was that a change in the quantum of proof
would not necessarily destroy the unique benefits of the juvenile
court.6 3
Although juvenile due process rights were extended, the Supreme
Court did not make a finding that the juvenile process was punitive.
This obviated the necessity of affording minors all the protections
inherent in adult criminal proceedings. Although the Gault and Win-
ship Courts made it clear that some constitutional protections apply,
the extent of the required protections was not decided.
In the plurality opinion of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,4 the Court
held that a delinquency proceeding is not a criminal prosecution
within the meaning and reach of the sixth amendment. 65 Therefore,
a jury trial was not mandated by the Constitution. The Court reiter-
ated the fundamental fairness standard established by Kent, and
stated that this standard emphasized factfinding procedures.6 The
Court concluded, however, that a jury was not an indispensable ele-
ment for accurate factfinding, and therefore was not deemed neces-
sary. 7 The majority's concern was that a right to a jury trial would
"remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and
will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of
an intimate, informal, protective proceeding. "68
The Gault and Winship opinions expressly noted the disparity be-
tween the idealistic theories of the juvenile justice system and the
reality of juvenile court practice.69 Although the McKeiver Court
61. Id. at 358.
62. Id. at 376. Justice Stewart joined Chief Justice Burger in the dissenting opin-
ion; Justice Black wrote a separate dissent.
63. Id. at 366.
64. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
65. Id. at 558.
66. Id. at 543; see also Winship, 397 U.S. at 366.
67. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. "The requirements of notice, counsel, confronta-
tion, cross-examination, and standard of proof naturally flowed from this emphasis. But
one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate
factfinding." Id.
68. Id. at 545.
69. Gault, 387 U.S. at 29-30. "So wide a gulf betweeii the State's treatment of
the adult and of the child requires a bridge sturdier than mere verbiage and reasons more
persuasive than clich6 can provide." Id. See also Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66.
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discussed some of the system's shortcomings,"0 it focused on "benev-
olent" theories rather than the actual state of the juvenile justice
system. The McKeiver Court listed the rights afforded by Gault and
Winship to support the factfinding emphasis.7 However, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination was left conspicuously unmentioned.7 2
The absence of this fifth amendment protection in the McKeiver
opinion was likely not an oversight. The privilege against self-incrim-
ination is not essential for accurate factfinding, and the policies that
underlie this privilege are in direct opposition to much of the
McKeiver analysis. In fact, this privilege may hinder the factfinder's
role.73 Fifth amendment protection reflects society's "preference for
an accusatorial rather than [an] inquisitorial system. 74 The
McKeiver Court attempted to emphasize the nonadversarial element
of the juvenile court. However, even though the juvenile court is
under a civil rubric, there is a definite adversarial element that can-
not be denied. 75
The dissent in McKeiver seems more consistent with the Gaulti
Winship analysis. Justice Douglas noted that the focus should not be
on whether the case is civil or nonpunitive. Rather, if a juvenile is
prosecuted for a criminal act and faces lengthy incarceration, he
should be "entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult.""6
The dissent asserted that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights re-
quired a right to a jury trial in this type of delinquency proceeding. 77
The McKeiver Court gave great deference to the states regarding
the experimentation and implementation of appropriate juvenile pro-
ceedings. The majority viewed the establishment of a right to a jury
trial as disrupting the juvenile process and impeding the experimen-
tation of the states.78 Although the Supreme Court did not afford a
jury trial right to all juvenile proceedings, it urged the states to "go
70. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544-45.
71. Id. at 544.
[Tihe applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by
Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness. As that standard was applied in
those two cases, we have an emphasis on factfinding procedures. The require-
ments of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standard of
proof naturally flow from this emphasis. But one cannot say that in our legal
system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding.
Id.
72. Id.
73. "The privilege, [against self-incrimination] while sometimes 'a shelter to the
guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent.'" Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 55 (1969).
74. Id. at 55.
75. To strengthen the adversarial focus of the fifth amendment, the Supreme
Court in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), stated that the double jeopardy clause
extended to juvenile proceedings.
76. McKeiver, 403, U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.
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forward" with jury right implementation. 9 A state may embrace the
feature of a jury right for juveniles in all cases or in certain types of
cases that it deems appropriate.
THE HISTORY OF A JUVENILE'S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN
CALIFORNIA
Before California established a separate juvenile court system,
there were two cases that dealt with the issue of whether juveniles
were entitled to a right to trial by jury. The first California-case, Ex
parte Ah Peen,8° involved a homeless sixteen-year-old boy with no
known parents.81 The trial court intervened to provide care and guid-
ance for the youth, and ordered him committed to an industrial
school.82 The minor appealed this order, contending that the pro-
ceeding violated his constitutional right to a jury trial.83 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the action of the magistrate did not
amount to a criminal prosecution and, therefore, the juvenile was not
entitled to a jury trial.84
It is noteworthy that this case did not involve a criminal act by the
minor. Rather, Ah Peen would be classified as a dependency case
under modern juvenile court proceedings.8" The court was simply
providing living accommodations, guidance, and care for a youth
with no apparent home and family.88 This situation is markedly dif-
ferent from a delinquency proceeding.87 In the latter situation, the
79. Id.
80. 51 Cal. 280 (1876).
81. Ah Peen was "leading an idle and dissolute life in said city . . .and not
subject to any parental control whatever - his parents being unknown . Id. at 280.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 16 (formerly art. I, § 3 in the CAL. CONST.
of 1849) (the right of trial by jury shall be secured to all); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15
(formerly art. 1, § 8 in the CAL. CONST. of 1848) (no person shall be deprived of liberty
without due process of law).
84. Ah Peen, 51 Cal. at 280.
85. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 1987). Any person under the age of
eighteen in California may be adjudged a dependent child of the court:
(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and has no
parent or guardian ....
(b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities of life, or who
is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode.
Id.
86. Ah Peen, 51 Cal. at 281. "Having been abandoned by his parents, the State,
as parens patriae, has succeeded to his control, and stands in loco parentis to him." Id.
87. "Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state . . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such
person to be a ward of the court." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1987).
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court determines whether a juvenile committed a criminal act, and
whether the child should be removed from his home and placed in a
state juvenile facility as a result. In a delinquency proceeding there
are often contested issues of fact which require due process protec-
tions, including the protections inherent in a jury trial.
In Ex parte Becknell,88 the California Supreme Court held that a
statute8" providing for the commitment of juveniles to Whittier State
School was unconstitutional. Becknell dealt with a juvenile who al-
legedly committed a criminal act. 0 Jonie Becknell, a thirteen-year-
old boy, was indicted by a grand jury for burglary. The grand jury
found that the charge was supported by sufficient evidence, and that
Jonie was a suitable candidate for the Whittier reform school. Solely
upon the recommendation of the grand jury, the Superior Court
committed Jonie until the age of his majority. Jonie was not given a
trial, and his parents were not notified of the proceeding.91
On appeal, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that
this type of proceeding was unconstitutional. The court expressly
stated that a "boy cannot be imprisoned as a criminal without a trial
by jury.' '9 2 The Becknell court did not cite any specific authority for
its holding. However, it did note that "all the cases cited by counsel




Ah Peen and Becknell highlighted the differences between crimi-
nal and custodial proceedings related to juveniles. If a juvenile was
charged with a criminal act, he could not be convicted, and conse-
quently have his liberty restrained, without the benefit and protec-
tion of a jury trial.94 However, if the matter before the court con-
cerned the proper custody and care of the juvenile, the court could
adjudge the minor a ward of the court without empaneling a jury.95
Therefore, prior to the adoption of the juvenile court system in Cali-
fornia in 1903, it is apparent that juveniles had a right to a jury trial
88. 119 Cal. 496, 51 P. 692 (1897).
89. 1893 Cal. Stat. 332. The statute provided:
If any accusation of the commission of any crime shall be made against any
minor, under the age of eighteen years, before any grand jury, and the charge
appears to be supported by evidence sufficient to put the accused upon trial, the
grand jury may, in their discretion, instead of finding an indictment against the
accused, return to the superior court that it appears to them that the accused is
a suitable person to be committed to the care and guardianship of said institu-
tion. The court may thereupon order such commitment, if satisfied from the
evidence that such commitment ought to be made, which examination may be
waived by the parent or guardian of such minor.
Id.
90. Becknell at 497, 51 P. at 693.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 498, 51 P. at 693.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See generally id. at 496, 51 P. 692 (1897); Ah Peen, 51 Cal. at 280.
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in delinquency-type proceedings.
In re Daedler 8 was the first case since the Juvenile Court Act of
1903 to involve a juvenile's right to a jury trial. Paul Daedler, a
fourteen-year-old youth, was charged with murder. The trial court
found that Daedler "did willfully and with malice aforethought...
murder . . . a human being."'97 Daedler was made a ward of the
court and was committed to the Preston School of Industry until he
attained the age of twenty-one. 98
Daedler appealed the decision, arguing that denial of his right to a
jury trial was unconstitutional.9 " However, the California Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the California
Constitution did not require a jury trial when a minor was tried for a
crime. The court stated that the juvenile justice system was the "cre-
ation of a modern philanthropic endeavor," 100 and its laws were not
"penal in character."''1 1 The laws were designed to rehabilitate, and
the minor "had no inherent right to a trial by jury."'12
The Daedler court relied on Ah Peen as the controlling California
authority. 03 The court did not distinguish between the criminal na-
ture of the proceeding'it was reviewing and the custodial determina-
tion involved in Ah Peen.0 1 The Daedler holding presented a clear
conflict with the court's earlier holding in Becknell, which recog-
nized that a minor had a right to a jury trial if he was charged with
a criminal offense.' 05 In both cases, the court had to determine
96. 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924).
97. Id. at 322, 228 P. at 468.
98. Id. at 323, 228 P. at 468.
99. Id. at 324, 228 P. at 468-69.
The particular sections of the constitution upon which the petitioner and coun-
sel rely in making this contention are section 7 of article I of the state constitu-
tion, which reads, in part, as follows: "The right of trail by jury shall be secure
to all and remain inviolate ... ." He also relies upon the provisions of section
13, article I, of the constitution which reads, in part, as follows: "In criminal
prosecutions in any court whatever the party accused shall have the right to a
speedy and public trial .... No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense; nor be compelled in any criminal case to.be a witness against
himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
Id.
100. Id. at 327, 228 P. at 470.
101. Id. at 332, 228 P. at 472. "The processes of the Juvenile Court law are...
not penal in character, and hence said minor has no inherent right to a trial by jury in
the course of the application of their beneficial and merciful provisions to this case." Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 325, 228 P. at 469.
104. Ah Peen, 51 Cal. 280 (1876); see also supra notes 80-87 and accompanying
text.
105. Becknell, 119 Cal. 496, 51 P. 692 (1897). See also supra notes 88-93 and
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whether a felony had been committed, and then, whether custody of
the child must be taken from the parents and given to the state.
However, the Daedler court summarily dismissed Becknell as brief
and unsupported, and therefore not controlling.106 Except for its in-
appropriate application of Ah Peen, the Daedler opinion did not cite
any other California cases to support its denial of a juvenile's right
to a jury trial. 10 7 Sixty-seven years later, Daedler remains the law in
California; however, the continued validity of that holding is
questionable.
A comprehensive analysis of the right to a jury trial under Cali-
fornia law was set out in People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe.1"'
The case involved a determination of whether there was a right to a
jury trial in a proceeding for forfeiture of a vehicle used to transport
narcotics.109 The California Supreme Court clearly delineated a test
to determine whether a right to a jury trial is afforded under the
California Constitution. 10
The court in Chevrolet Coupe stated that English common law
defined and determined the jury trial right.' A right to a jury trial
is the right as it existed at common law at the time the California
Constitution was adopted. 1 2 The right to a jury trial in California is
a "purely historical question, a fact which is to be ascertained like
any other social, political or legal fact." 113 In passing the state con-
stitution, the legislature could not grant courts the power solely to
try cases that had previously been tried by judge and jury. The legis-
lature could not change such a fundamental common law right sim-
ply by giving juvenile delinquency proceedings a civil or equitable
label.11 4 However, this is exactly what the court seems to have done
in the case of California juveniles.
accompanying text.
106. Daedler, 194 Cal. at 327, 228 P. at 470.
107. The Daedler court cited the nonbinding authority of six out-of-state cases.
The three California cases cited were not on point regarding the right to trial by jury. In
re Maginnis, 162 Cal. 200, 121 P. 723 (1912) (upholding an act concerning dependent
and delinquent minor children providing for their care, custody and maintenance); Moore
v. Williams, 19 Cal. App' 600, 127 P. 509 (1912) (juvenile courts provide a means to
restrain and reform wayward persons); Nicholl v. Koster, 157 Cal. 416, 108 P. 302
(1910) (the purpose of the juvenile court act is to train minors in "good habits and
correct principles").
108. 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951) [hereinafter Chevrolet Coupe].
109. Id. at 300, 231 P.2d at 843.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 287, 231 P.2d at 835.
112. People v. Richardson, 138 Cal. App. 404, 408, 32 P.2d 433, 435 (1934).
113. Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d at 287, 231 P.2d at 835.
114. Id. at 286-87, 231 P.2d at 835.
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THE Daedler COURT MISAPPLIED ENGLISH COMMON LAW
The Daedler court's denial of a juvenile's right to a jury trial was
based on the erroneous assumption that minors at English common
law did not have this right."15 The court incorrectly noted that in
1660, the English court of chancery, in the capacity of parens pa-
triae, assumed jurisdiction over all minors in the kingdom."16 The
purpose of this court of equity involved the "care, protection, disci-
pline, and reform" of juveniles. 117 The Daedler court readily ac-
knowledged that the same type of jurisdiction held by the English
courts of equity passed to the California courts when those courts
were established."" Therefore, because juveniles were under equity
jurisdiction, they were not afforded the rights attending criminal
proceedings.
The Daedler court's analysis of English common law is cursory at
best. Further, the support of the court's findings is minimal and in-
complete. The court neglected to note a very important historical
fact: the right to a jury trial was afforded to English minors if they
were tried for an alleged criminal act.1 9
English common law divided- the age of minority120 into three
stages.'2' A minor up to the age of ten and one-half was considered
"under the age of discretion,"'122 and could not be punished for the
commission of a criminal act. From the age of ten and one-half to
fourteen, a minor could be punished if he was found capable of the
requisite understanding and criminal intent. 23 After the age of four-
115. Daedler, 194 Cal. at 324-25, 228 P. at 469.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 325, 228 P. at 467.
118. Id.
119. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *22-23.
120. Minority was termed "infancy" at English common law. Infancy was consid-
ered a defect of the understanding. Other species of this defect of will included: idiocy,
lunacy, and intoxication. Id. at 21-22.
121. Id. at 22. At civil law, a minor was defined as a person "under twenty-five
years old." Minority was divided into 3 stages:
I) Infantia: from birth until age seven.
2) Puberitia: from age seven to fourteen.
a) Aetas infantiae proxima: seven to ten and a half.
b) Aetas pubertati proxima: ten and a half to fourteen.
3) Pubertas: from age fourteen to twenty-five.
Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. "During the other half stage of childhood, approaching to puberty, from
ten and an half to fourteen, they were indeed punishable, if found to be doli capaces, or
capable of mischief; but with many mitigations, and not with the utmost rigor of the
law." Id.
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teen, a minor could be punished for any criminal act he committed.
If a minor was found able to stand trial, he was tried and convicted
in the identical manner as an adult who had committed the same
act. A juvenile at this stage of minority was even subject to capital
punishment.1 24 In order to sustain a conviction, the "judge and
jury" 125 had to establish two essential facts: the trier of fact had to
find that the minor in fact had committed a criminal act,22 and that
the minor was capable of discerning right from wrong.'2 7
Once a minor was convicted of a criminal offense, the judge, with-
out a jury, could invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of equity. 28 If
the judge determined that it was in the minor's best interest, the
state, acting as parens patriae, would assume control over the minor
and determine an appropriate disposition. 29 Therefore, state author-
ity to determine wardship was conditioned by the fact that a minor
already had the benefit of a jury trial.
Because Daedler misapplied the common law, the court estab-
lished a procedure authorizing wardship over a juvenile when the
juvenile merely was accused of a criminal offense. The court then
determined the truth of the accusation without providing the protec-
tions of a jury trial.
Several other cases following Daedler addressed the same issue of
whether juveniles are entitled to a right to trial by jury. None of the
opinions appeared to reanalyze the' issue. Rather, each case simply
noted that Daedler was controlling and dismissed the action.1 30 In re
Javier A.13' is the first California case since Daedler that squarely
confronts the juvenile's right to a jury trial. The Superior Court of
Los Angeles, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, found that Javier
A. had committed three counts of attempted murder, and that he




125. Id. at 23.
126. The English courts required a determination that the minor in fact had com-
mitted a crime. Id. at 23.
127. If the minor "could discern between good and evil, he may be convicted
.I" d.
128. See generally In re Javier A., 159 Cal. 3d 913, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1984).
129. Id. "[I]n 1850 England the decision whether a minor had committed a crime
first had to be made, through a trial by jury in the law courts. Only then could the equity
courts determine whether he should be made a ward of the court." Id. at 933, 206 Cal.
Rptr. at 398.
130. See, e.g., In re Paul A., Ill Cal. App. 3d 928, 168 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1980);
People v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 271, 539 P.2d 807, 124 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1975); In re
Clarence B., 37 Cal. App. 3d 676, 112 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1974); Richard M. v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971); In re T.R.S., I Cal. App.
3d 178, 81 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1969).
131. 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1984).
132. Id. at 920, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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In its review of the trial court's ruling, the Second District Court
of Appeal undertook an exhaustive study of the California juvenile's
right to a jury trial.' The Javier court determined that juveniles
had been denied a jury right based on incorrect historical analysis.
This misinterpretation of English common law resulted in the erro-
neous precedent set by the California Supreme Court in Daedler. In
disputing the Daedler holding, the Javier court examined the docu-
ments filed in that case. It did not appear that the Daedler court had
before it the historical data that was considered by Javier.13 , Apply-
ing the test set out by Chevrolet Coupe, the Javier court concluded
that a juvenile's right to a jury trial was guaranteed by the Califor-
nia Constitution.3 5 The court stated that a juvenile should not be
adjudicated a ward of the court in a delinquency proceeding without
being afforded a right to a jury trial. However, the lower court felt
bound by stare decisis and upheld the sixty-year-old precedent deny-
ing a jury right to juveniles.' 3 6
Although the Javier court followed Daedler, it stated: "the issue
of right to jury trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings is not just
133. Id.
134. The Daedler opinion does not mention - and presumably the court did
not have before it - any of the historical information discussed in this opinion.
Daedler does not even touch upon the Infant Felons Act of 1840 which required
trial by jury before a juvenile offender could be declared a ward of the court in
England. Nor does the opinion mention Parliament's rejection of the juvenile
offender bill of 1850 which sought to allow juveniles to be committed to reform
school for several years without trial by jury. It does not discuss the 1840
Youthful Offender bill which was defeated or the successful 1847 act which
limited the denial of jury trial to youngsters charged with trivial crimes and
deprived of liberty for less than three months. Indeed the California Supreme
Court in 1924 may not have had available to it the research materials needed to
uncover the true historical facts on this issue.
Id. at 953, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 932-48, 206 Cal.
Rptr. at 397-409 (an in-depth discussion of a jury right for juveniles at English common
law).
135. Id. at 954, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 415. "Were it within our power, we would re-
verse the judgment against [Javier A.] and remand the case for trial by jury consistent
with the guarantee of article I, section 16 of the California Constitution." Id.
136. Id. at 954, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (citing Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court,
57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1962)).
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdic-
tion are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction
.... The decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed by all
the state courts of California . . . .Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must
accept the law declared by superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to over-
rule decisions of a higher court.
Id.
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ripe for Supreme Court reconsideration, it is overripe."' 137 The appel-
late court laid out a clear, well-reasoned opinion as to why the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court should overrule Daedler and afford California
juveniles a jury trial right. The California Supreme Court refused to
review the issue.' 38
THE MODERN TREND TOWARD CRIMINALIZATION OF JUVENILE
COURTS IN CALIFORNIA
The Daedler holding was based in part on the philosophy of the
emerging California juvenile courts. The main purpose of the Juve-
nile Court Act of 1903 was to provide proper care, guidance, and
education for wayward youths, whether or not they were charged
with a criminal violation. 3 ' Because the Act treated delinquent and
dependent children alike, the Daedler court did not deem it neces-
sary to afford procedural due process rights to juveniles charged with
a criminal act. Affording juveniles the "constitutional rights of those
charged with crime" was seen as inconsistent with "the more en-
lightened view" of the California juvenile courts.140
The court envisioned itself as a surrogate parent, and constitu-
tional protections seemed out of place in this "parent-child" relation-
ship. The function of the juvenile court was to perform "parental
duties at a time when the child is not entitled either by the laws of
nature or of the state to absolute freedom, but is subjected to the
restraint and custody of a natural or legally constituted guardian to
whom it owes obedience and subjection.""' The Daedler court fur-
ther stated that "'[n]o constitutional right is violated but one of the
most important duties which organized society owes to its helpless
members is performed in just the measure that the law is framed
with wisdom and is carefully administered.' 142 The court in
Daedler did not seem to think that the status of a minor was deserv-
ing of due process protections. Further, the Juvenile Court Act did
not mandate extention of these protections to minors.
The Daedler court supported its holding by citing the rationale
contained in Commonwealth v. Fisher'43 - a factually similar case
137. Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 967, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
138. Id. at 976, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
139. In re Maginnis, 162 Cal. 200, 204, 121 P. 723, 725-26 (1912). The Juvenile
Court Act of 1903 was aimed "at the proper custody and education of children who lack
the care and control deemed essential to their right development, whether or not their
situation be such as to be likely to lead them to actual crime." Id.
140. Daedler, 194 Cal. at 323, 228 P. at 469.
141. Id. at 329, 228 P. at 471 (quoting Von Walters v. Board, 132 Ind. 569, 32
N.E. 568 (1892)).
142. Daedler, 194 Cal. at 330, 228 P. at 471 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fisher,
213 Pa. 48, 57, 62 A. 198, 201 (1905)).
143. 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
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decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Fisher court de-
nied Pennsylvania juveniles the right to a jury trial.
4 However, the
Fisher court went on to state that the provisions of the Pennsylvania
Juvenile Court Act would not be valid if the juvenile was subjected
to a trial. The purpose of the act was to prevent a trial. However, if
it was determined that the public welfare required the minor to be
tried, a jury trial was not precluded.'
45 The Daedler court fully
adopted the Fisher court rationale. 46
Although Daedler remains the law in California, the past sixty-
five years have brought about a substantial and dramatic change in
California juvenile proceedings. The first significant change occurred
in the early 1960s. The California Law Revision Commission was
authorized to perform an in-depth study of the juvenile system. The
Commission's report advocated a clear division of jurisdictional cate-
gories: delinquency and dependency. The purpose was to publicly
distinguish "the delinquent [minor] and the juvenile who is innocent
of any wrongdoing. ' ' 4  The rationale for the distinction was to pre-
vent the misconception that all minors associated with the juvenile
court system committed wrongful acts.
The Commission's recommendation highlights a subtle shift in ju-
venile law. The early juvenile court system focused on the misguided
child, rather than on the act committed.
48 However, in delinquency
proceedings, the focus is now directed toward the act committed, not
simply what intervention would be in the child's best interest. This
initially imperceptible change in focus began the criminalizing pro-
cess in the treatment of delinquency adjudications.
149
144. Id. at 53-54, 62 A. at 200.
145. Id.
146. Daedler, 194 Cal. at 330, 228 P. at 471.
147. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16 (footnote omitted). See CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION
COMMISSION, Vol. 3 (Oct. 1960).
148. The child . .. was to be made "to feel that he is the object of [the
state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules
of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent ri-
gidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive
and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime
and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be "treated" and "reha-
bilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization,
were to be "clinical" rather than punitive.
Id.
149. The Legislature also codified other juvenile law including: CAL. WELF. 
&
INST. CODE §§ 660 (notice and hearing), 627.5 (Miranda applies), 700 (continuance to
prepare a defense), 700.5 (continuance to secure witnesses), 701 (proof beyond a 
reason-
able doubt), 702.5 (privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confront 
wit-
nesses), 702 (upon a finding that the minor has committed an offense which would 
be
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After the United States Supreme Court holding in Gault, the Cal-
ifornia courts and legislature responded by recognizing the adversary
nature of delinquency proceedings. Although California courts have
followed the lead set by Gault and its progeny, the California Legis-
lature has been the primary force behind the criminalization process.
The original purpose of the juvenile court as codified was to provide
for the "spiritual, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the mi-
nor." 150 This section was amended in 1975 to include not only the
interests of the minor, but also the protection of the public.151 The
statute specifically stated that juvenile judges, peace officers, and
other court personnel must take public protection into account when
making a delinquency determination. Two years later, this entire
code section was repealed152 and codified in Welfare and Institutions
Code section 202. This section emphasized protection of the public.
It stated that an additional function of the court was to "impose a
sense of responsibility on a minor for his own acts. '15 3
These major legislative changes highlight the establishment of a
juvenile justice system with a dual focus. There is often tension be-
tween the policy of protecting the public from juvenile delinquents
and the policy of rehabilitating, as much as possible, juvenile delin-
quents. Imposing a sense of responsibility for acts committed has a
punitive dimension. In 1984, the legislature made further inroads to-
ward the criminalization of the juvenile justice system. The new pro-
posal allows the issue of punishment to be taken into consideration in
a delinquency adjudication.'" Although the punishment must be
consistent with other rehabilitative objectives, 55 it is punishment
nonetheless. The concept of punishment was not part of the original
underpinnings of the juvenile justice system. Therefore, the criminal-
ization process undercuts the original philosophy that juvenile courts
are only rehabilitative in nature. 5 6 It is important to note that these
changes, along with the discussion to follow, deal strictly with delin-
punished alternately as a felony or misdemeanor in adult court, the juvenile court must
declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony) (West 1987).
150. 1961 Cal. Stat. 3460.
151. 1975 Cal. Stat. 1872 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 502).
152. 1977 Cal. Stat. 2783.
153. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1987).
154. Id. § 202 (amended in 1984).
155. Id.
156. One California appellate court observed: "While the juvenile court law pro-
vides that adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a
conviction of a crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes this is a legal fiction,
presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason." In re Contreras, 109
Cal. App. 2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952). California juvenile courts also have
stated that delinquency proceedings are "in reality criminal proceedings." The claim that
they are "solely for the protection of the minor is pure fiction." In re Jerald C., 26 Cal.
3d 1, 8 n.4, 678 P.2d 917, 921, 201 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (1984) (quoting In re Gregory
K., 106 Cal. App. 3d 164, 168, 165 Cal. Rptr. 35, 37 (1980).
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quency proceedings. Much of the original intent of the early juvenile
courts is still present in the dependency aspect of California law.
To further the public protection policy, the legislature mandated
that a public prosecutor appear on behalf of the people. 157 The pros-
ecuting attorney's presence is mandated only when a juvenile has
violated a law. 58 Prior to this revised statute, the district attorney's
role was strictly limited to assisting the court.'59 The newly required
appearance, for the protection of the public, clearly establishes juve-
nile delinquency proceedings as adversarial.
The proposal by the Law Revision Commission recommended that
all juvenile proceedings be conducted nonadversarially. However, the
legislature changed the proposed statute by adding an exception
when issues of fact or law are contested. 60 This change was intended
"to tip [the] balance in the direction of the minor's due process
rights and away from [the] informality" traditionally associated with
juvenile proceedings. 6' The inference drawn from the legislature's
action is that proceedings are to be conducted in an adversarial man-
ner in contested delinquency hearings.
The court must prove that the juvenile committed the specific act
charged. 1 2 This must be accomplished by proof beyond a riasonable
doubt, using the same evidentiary standards as used in adult crimi-
nal proceedings. 6 3 Once convicted, the minor may not be physically
confined for periods in excess of the maximum prison term received
by an adult convicted of the same offense.16  Therefore, a juvenile
sentence directly relates to the specific act committed - not what is
determined to be the best interest of each minor. The length of in-
carceration is determined by the time periods established in adult
criminal proceedings. 6 5 It is noteworthy that an average juvenile
157. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 681(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1987).
158. Id. § 602. The legislature did not enact this change in truancy to dependency
cases. Id. § 601.
159. Prior to its amendment in 1976, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 681 (West
1974).
160. Id. § 680 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987).
161. People v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 271, 279, 539 P.2d 807, 812, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 47, 52 (1975).
162. In re Robert G., 31 Cal. 3d 437, 440, 644 P.2d 837, 838, 182 Cal. Rptr. 644,
645 (1982).
163. 1971 Cal. Stat. 1833. Initially, "all relevant and material" information re-
garding the circumstances that brought a juvenile before the court was admissible as
evidence. 1961 Cal. Stat. 3482.
164. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726 (West 1984).
165. The term used to determine the length of confinement is the "maximum"
term used in adult proceedings. Id. The sentencing in adult courts is broken into three
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sentence is longer than a sentence for an adult convicted of the same
offense.' 6"
Many explanations for the early juvenile court system are no
longer considered valid in California. The lack of due process protec-
tion and procedural informality formerly were considered counter-
balanced by other benefits that juveniles received. These benefits
were used as a rationale for the denial of a right to a jury trial. One
reason was that a juvenile could avoid the stigma of a criminal con-
viction. Initially, when there was no distinction between dependent
and delinquent youth, this may have been a valid assumption. How-
ever, the label of "delinquent" in modern society connotes the idea of
criminal conduct. This label "in the eyes of neighbors, family mem-
bers, and peers, [may make it difficult for a minor] to resume con-
ventional activities. ' 16 7 The stigma of delinquency is arguably as
detrimental as the criminal label the system tried to avoid."6 8
Another reason used to deny juveniles a right to a jury trial was
that the juvenile proceedings needed to remain private and confiden-
tial.""9 In 1961, with limited exceptions, the public was not admitted
to juvenile court hearings.' 7 ° The legislature opened the doors to the
juvenile courts in 1980. If a juvenile is charged with one of eighteen
enumerated serious offenses,'1 public access to the proceedings is
permitted. The public and press are permitted entry "on the same
basis as.they may be admitted to trials in a court of criminal juris-
diction.' 7  Four years later, the legislature further eroded a juve-
nile's right to privacy. The media is no longer mandated to omit a
juvenile's name from publication if he is charged with one of the
eighteen specified felonies.173
Originally, juvenile records were to be sealed so that transgres-
sions due to youthful indiscretion would not follow the juvenile into
his adult life. The decision to have the records sealed was based on
the presumption that the acts committed were not criminal; there-
fore, no punishment should be involved. In 1981, the legislature
time periods. The maximum term is equivalent to the upper limit, or the aggravated term
found in the Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
166. See supra note 165.
167. GAULT: WHAT Now FOR THE JUVENILE COURT?, supra note 17, at 47 (quot-
ing G. WHEELER & L. COTTWELL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY - ITS PREVENTION AND
CONTROL (1965).
168. "A juvenile delinquent is viewed as a junior criminal hardly less threatening
to peace and order than his more mature counterpart." Fox, supra note 6, at 1231.
169. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
170. The judge could admit "such persons as he deems to have a direct or legiti-
mate interest in the particular case or the work of the court." 1961 Cal. Stat. 3480.
171. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 676 (West 1987).
172. 1980 Cal. Stat. 662.
173. 1984 Cal. Stat. 1747. "The name of the minor found to have committed one
of the offenses listed . . . shall not be confidential, unless the court for good cause so
orders." Id.
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amended Penal Code section 1203.174 The amendment allows infor-
mation contained in a juvenile's record to be considered if there is a
law violation after the age of majority. This information can be used
either to deny an adult probation or to enhance punishment.175 Many
juvenile courts routinely furnish government agencies, the military,
and even private employers information contained in juvenile files.1
7
1
THE BENEFITS OF PROVIDING A JUVENILE THE RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL
In denying a right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court in McKeiver
focused only on the jury as a factfinder, and neglected to note the
other important protections that a jury provides. 177 A right to a jury
trial has always been regarded as essential for the impartial adminis-
tration of justice. 17 This right helps prevent oppression by govern-
ment and arbitrary judicial decisionmaking. The jury trial provisions
reflect "a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and lib-
erty of the citizen to one judge."'1 79 In juvenile court, a judge will
often see the same juvenile on numerous occasions. Increased contact
may make it more likely that a judge will develop prejudicial atti-
tudes against the minor. Therefore, a right to a jury trial may be a
particularly important safeguard in the juvenile court setting.
The theory persists that juveniles are vulnerable, needing the pro-
tection of the court, and therefore must be shielded from a trial.
However, in reality, California juveniles are now subjected to a veri-
table trial. 80 As Justice Brennan notes, large government agencies,
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(b) (West 1987) (the 1986 amendment inserted the
third sentence in subdivision (b)).
175. Id.
176. Gault, 387 U.S. at 24.
177. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 528.
178. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *379
(1780). Blackstone equated the right to trial by jury to the cornerstone of civil society.
The jury system was instituted because of the English awareness that a select few judges
are not always attentive to the interests of many.
179. Gault, 387 U.S. at 20. "Due Process of the law is the primary and indispensa-
ble foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social
compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the
state may exercise." Id.
180. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 39 n.65 (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86-87 (1967). The Supreme Court has recognized that in-
creased formality in the juvenile justice system is desirable:
Fears have been expressed that lawyers would make juvenile court proceedings
adversary. No doubt this is partly true, but it is partly desirable. Informality is
often abused. The juvenile courts ... deal with many cases involving conduct
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acting in the capacity of parens patriae, never can actually function
in a parental role for youth. 81 Therefore, to protect vulnerable
youth, increased protections should be instituted in delinquency
proceedings.
The right to a jury trial is not afforded in California delinquency
proceedings as it is in the criminal courts. It is argued that the use of
the jury trial in juvenile court would result in increased formality
and publicity, both of which would have negative effects on the sys-
tem's rehabilitative focus.182 As this Comment has previously noted,
the California courts and legislature have substantially criminalized
juvenile delinquency proceedings to the extent that they are already
formalized 8 3 and often public. Therefore, the rationale for the con-
tinued denial of a right to a jury trial is no longer valid.
Increased procedural safeguards in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings should include the right to a jury trial.18 4 Juveniles have a clear
sense of fairness. If a juvenile perceives he is protected from poten-
tial arbitrary judicial decision making, this may actually encourage
the courts' rehabilitative efforts.185 If a right to a jury trial were in-
stituted, it would not affect individualized dispositional orders.1 86
Therefore, this right would afford juveniles due process protection
while still allowing for an individualized, rehabilitative focus.
that can lead to incarceration or close supervision for long periods, and there-
fore juveniles often need the same safeguards that are granted to adults.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 39 n.65.
181. See generally Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627-28 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
183. See People v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 284-85, 539 P.2d at 815, 124 Cal.
Rptr. at 56.
[lI]n light of the broad areas of factual and legal dispute, which necessarily
would have to be resolved in an adversary setting - and also in light of the
loss of confidentiality which had already occurred - any benefits normally at-
tendant upon an informal proceedings had been rendered speculative.
Id.
184. "Increased procedural safeguards including the right to a jury trial in delin-
quency cases are advocated." IJA-ABA JOINT COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 22 (1977).
185. Kalven, The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 118 (1971).
[A]n important function of the jury is its capacity to enhance the youthful
offender's perception of the juvenile process. . . . In these circumstances [of
overcrowded dockets, understaffing of trained personnel], jury trial is essential
to the appearance of fairness, impartiality, and orderliness to the juvenile and
the general public.
Id.
186. Winship, 397 U.S. at 366-67.
[T]he opportunity during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing for a
wide-ranging review of the child's social history and for his individualized
treatment will remain unimpaired. Similarly, there will be ho effect on the pro-
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CONCLUSION
Assuming that the Daedler holding was valid in 1927, the basis
for the holding is not applicable to modern California juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. Daedler's rationale for denial of constitutional
protections was based on the fact that juveniles could not be sub-
jected to a trial. Unlike the treatment of juveniles at the time of
Daedler, there is now a clear distinction between dependency and
delinquency proceedings. Therefore, the denial of a jury right can no
longer be based on the contention that juvenile delinquents are not
subjected to an adversarial proceeding. Modern delinquency adjudi-
cations are very much a trial.
The California juvenile justice system has gone through a meta-
morphosis since the Daedler holding. Both the legislature and the
California Supreme Court have criminalized delinquency proceed-
ings. In fact, the legislature has criminalized delinquency proceed-
ings to the extent that it is difficult to distinguish them from an adult
criminal trial.
The California Supreme Court has declined to readdress the issue
of a juvenile's right to a jury trial. Because of the present state of
California juvenile delinquency proceedings, the denial of a right to
a jury trial can no longer be justified. Therefore, the legislature
should intervene and afford California juveniles this essential right.
Because the California Supreme Court declined to grant a hearing
in Javier, it does not appear likely that this situation will be rectified
by the judiciary. The inconsistency between Daedler and the status
of a juvenile's right to jury trial at common law, and the uncertainty
of future judicial action, places the legislature in the best position to
address this issue. Legislative intervention is also preferable due to
the timeliness and clarity with which the legislature can act. Accord-
ingly, the California Legislature is urged to amend the Welfare and
Institutions Code in order to resolve this overripe issue.
CAROL R. BERRY
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